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Designing Smart Objects to Support
Affording Situations: Exploiting
Affordance Through an
Understanding of Forms of
Engagement
Chris Baber*
School of Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
In this paper I consider how the concept of “affordance” has been adapted from
the original writings of Gibson and applied to interaction design. I argue that a clear
understanding of affordance shifts the goal of interaction design from one of solely
focusing on either the physical object or the capabilities of the person, toward an
understanding of interactivity. To do this, I develop the concept of Forms of Engagement,
originally proposed to account for tool use. Finally, I extend this concept to interacting
with modified tangible user interfaces, or “animate objects.” These animate objects not
only sense how they are being used, but also communicate with each other to develop a
shared intent, and provide prompts and cues to encourage specific actions. In this way,
the human-object-environment system creates affording situations in pursuit of shared
intentions and goals. In order to determine when to provide prompts and cues, the
objects need to have a model of how they ought to be used and what intention they
are being used to achieve. Consequently, affordances become not only the means by
which actions are encouraged but also the manner in which intentions are identified and
agreed.
Keywords: affordance, smart objects, animate objects, interactivity, forms of engagement
INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by three simple questions: (i) how do people know how to use smart objects
(i.e., how do people respond to the form and function of smart objects in order to achieve goals)? (ii)
how do objects make sense of the manner in which they are being used (i.e., can objects recognize
different ways in which a person interacts with them)? (iii) how should designers design smart
objects to enable people to use these appropriately (i.e., is it possible to better inform design practice
so that we can predict the successes and challenges of interacting with smart objects)? Unpacking
this a little, a “smart object” (Kortuem et al., 2010) is some artifact with which a person can interact,
but which is capable of sensing that it is being interacted with, capable of making inferences from
these sensor data, capable of communicating these inferences with other artifacts, and capable
of guiding the person to perform further actions. Knowing how to use an object could involve
problem-solving in which features of the object are associated with functions, and these functions
associated with a plan to act. But often, there is little overt, conscious awareness in performing the
action.
Baber Forms of Engagement
By way of a motivating example, imagine that you are reaching
to pick up a cup containing a hot drink.The handle of the cup
could be grasped in a particular way (say, two fingers through
the handle and the thumb resting on the top), or the body of
the cup could be held in your palm with fingers and thumb
wrapping around it. Which grasp you select depends on, among
other things, the heat of the contents of the cup, whether the cup
is full to the brim, whether the handle is on one side or the other.
However, it is unlikely that your selection arises from conscious
deliberation: you simply pick up the cup. As Wittgenstein noted,
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden
because of their simplicity and familiarity.” (Wittgenstein, 1958,
p.50). The concept of affordance helps frame this activity and
explain how it can be performed without conscious intervention.
In other words, very often, we simply “know” what to do.
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, this knowledge
has been termed “procedural” (Anderson, 1981), tacit (Polyani,
1966), “implicit” (Berry and Broadbent, 1988), or “automatic”
(Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). It
is from these different traditions that one can appreciate what
“affordance” involves. Relating this to design, one could also
suggest that understanding such implicit, subliminal interaction
could align neatly with some formulations of the concept of
nudging, in which people might be encouraged to perform
actions on certain ways and where such encouragement would
be at the edge of conscious awareness (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). Nudging could, for example, involve the cup prompting
the user to pick it up (perhaps to encourage the person to drink
more water) or it could encourage picking the cup up with one
hand rather than the other (perhaps as part of rehabilitation)
or it could encourage the person not to pick it up (perhaps to
discourage the person from drinking coffee after a certain time
of day). In these instances, the cup takes on the role of a smart
(possibly irritating, possibly helpful) partner in performing an
action. For me, the question is whether this partnering could be
both beneficial and performed without conscious awareness. So,
could interaction with a smart object be described in terms of
affordance. I begin this paper with a short account of how the
concept of affordance has developed, with particular reference to
interaction design.
A Brief History of “Affordance”
For many people working in the field of Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI), their first encounter with the concept
of “affordance” probably came from Norman’s (1988) The
Psychology of Everyday Things [he later, in 2002, rewrote this as
The Design of Everyday Things]. In this book, Norman presents
“affordance” as an act of interpretation, in which the form
of an object is seen in relation to a specific action. So, the
flat plate on a door “affords” pushing. From this perspective,
the “affordance” is a visual clue, provided by the object, as to
its intended functioning: “Plates are for pushing. Knobs are
for turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for
throwing or bouncing.” (p. 9). What is deceptively attractive
about this notion, for design at least, is the implication that the
physical form of the object corresponds with a conceptual model
that the user of the object brings to the interaction. In other
words, Norman’s (1988) definition, while it looks to be based
on perception, is really about interpreting the object’s functions
in terms of specific features, and linking this interpretation to
a goal that one wishes to achieve. Returning to our example
of picking up a cup, this implies that one needs to selectively
determine which features of the cup (and its contents) are most
salient to the goal of drinking from it (under certain constraints,
like not spilling the contents or scalding one’s hand). In other
words, there is an implication that, prior to performing an action,
one engages in a sort of problem-solving which allows salient
features to be elicited and interpreted. Later, Norman (1999)
distinguished “perceived affordances” from what he defined as
Gibsonian or “real affordances.” It is worth noting at this point
that there are extreme differences between “perceived” and “real”
affordances. For one thing, Gibson’s (1977, 1979) claim is that
we have a perceptual system which is tuned (through evolution,
experience, learning) to the environment. This means that there
is no requirement for any form of interpretation of information;
we just “see” (or hear or otherwise perceive) a pattern to
which we can respond. To repeat our example, a cup full of
steaming hot coffee is “seen” as a different object (supporting
different actions) to a half-full cup of cold milk. When Norman
uses the word “perceive,” this is not in the same manner that
Gibson uses it; Norman seems to suggest that perception is
an active process of extracting features and assigning meaning,
whereas for Gibson, perception is the capability of being sensitive
to information. Later still, Norman (2008) separated “real
affordances” from signifiers, i.e., perceptual information about
objects.
It is worth tracking the term “affordance” back further.
Gibson taught a course on the phenomenological philosophy
of Merleau-Ponty, and the Gestalt psychologist Koffka was a
colleague of Gibson’s in the 1930s (Kaufer and Chemero, 2015).
Key to Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) Phenomenology is the notion
of intentionality, which is concerned with how we “see” an
object in terms of how we will interact with it (rather than as
a collection of features). That is, we see the intentional object
in relation to our intended action. One way of appreciating
this, is through the concept of “Gestalt” (with which Merleau-
Ponty was familiar), which is not some property of the object
but rather the combination of the sensory stimulation evoked
by an object in a given context. In Norman’s (1988) glossing
of “affordance,” the object becomes imbued with meaning in a
way that Gibson (and Gestalt psychologists, and Merleau-Ponty)
resisted. This means not only that the “Gestalt” is more than
the sum of its parts, but also that the object can be interacted
with differently under different conditions. This reiterates our
distinction between cups of hot coffee and cold milk. In order
to interact with an object, the individual must have the ability
to act upon or with that object; and so, the individual can be
considered in terms of effectivities (Turvey and Shaw, 1979). In
this respect, environmental constraints (in terms of properties
of objects) are responded to in terms of bodily constraints (in
terms of effectivities). Stoffregen (2003) and (Chemero, 2003;
Chemero et al., 2003) dispute the implication that “affordance”
arises because the object elicits a dispositional response in the
user, and they propose that this should not be regarded in
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terms of dispositions (that is, consistent responses to objects)
but rather in terms of abilities (that is, flexible and adaptive
styles of interaction). Furthermore, as Osiurak et al. (2017)
point out, the notion of effectivity conflates two kinds of action
possibilities—those offered by the body and those provided by
objects.
In terms of Gestalt psychology, Lewin (1936) developed the
concept of Aufforderungscharaktere (translated as “demand
character,” “invitation-character” or “prompt-character”)
indicating the properties of an object which call for a certain
behavior. This describes interaction with an object in a context,
in terms of “valences” (which are a function of the person’s
(motivational) state and the properties of the environment in
which they are acting). This implies (I feel) that the relationship
between object and action would vary according to person
and environment (much as Merleau-Ponty, 1945 suggests). In
contrast, Gibson (1979) claims that “affordances” are invariant
and quotes his colleague Koffka as saying, “Each things say what
it is. . . a fruit says ‘Eat me’, water says ‘Drink me’, thunder says
‘Fear me’. . . ” (Koffka, 1955, p.7). My problem with this claim
is that it seems to return us to the idea that an “affordance”
is a property of the object and is independent of the viewer.
In contrast, in order to perceive an object’s affordance, one
needs to have prior experience of using objects of this type and
a set of beliefs as to how such objects ought to be used. This
gives a strong cultural and experiential basis to the response to
affordance in ways that Gibson was seeking to avoid through his
insistence that perception of affordance was a direct response
to the visual appearance of an object. Gaver (1991) suggested
that one could separate affordance from perceptual information,
and introduced terms such as “false affordance” (in which the
form of object implies a possible action, say a decal on a product
that looks like a button) and “hidden affordance” (in which
perceptual information is obscured). Although the notions of
“false” and “hidden” affordance are useful, this relies on the
conflation of “affordance” with function. This creates further
confusion in the application of affordance to design—should
we be concerned with designing visual signifiers that cue an
action (which is, surely, much the same as stating that the
form of an object signifies its functions, which designers know
anyway) or does affordance provide another perspective on
design?
From his interpretation of Gibson’s various proposals about
“affordance,” Chemero (2009) suggests that, “Affordances are
neither properties of the animal alone nor properties of the
environment alone. Instead, they are relations between the
abilities of an animal and some feature of a situation.” (p.191).
This observation is significant to the current paper for three
reasons. First, it recognizes that affordances arise through
relations in animal-object-environment systems (rather than
existing as properties of any constituent component). This raises
questions about what the designer is designing in order to
support affordance. My answer to this is that design, in this
context is less about the fashioning of objects (although, of
course, these are important) and more about choreographing
situations in which people interact with objects. Second, the idea
that affordances are relations implies that people rarely attend
to the specific features of the context in which these relations
occur. In their discussion of affordance, Still and Dark (2013)
suggest that people respond to affordances “automatically,” i.e.,
with little or no conscious awareness or need for attentional
control. Similarly, the use of highly familiar objects would involve
minimal attentional demand, but when confronted with a novel
or unfamiliar object, there would be a need to construct a plan
of how to interact with it (Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys et al.,
2010). Furthermore, if affordances guide action then this could
only be for someone able to perceive the relevant “information,”
able to perform the relevant action, and able to relate the
action to a desirable goal (Roux and Bril, 2005; Fairlie and
Barham, 2016). As Kirsh (2013) has it, “goals make perception
enactive” (Kirsh, 2013, p. 10). To illustrate this, he gives the
example of a stonemason (or bricklayer) who “. . .will look at
bricks for places to apply cement; when looking at an odd
brick he will ‘see’ the particular trowel shape that is needed.”
(Kirsh, 2013, p. 9). For someone without the experience of
bricklaying, there is less likely to be distinctions between bricks
and less likely for these distinctions to result in changes in
action.
Formally Describing Affordance
Lewin (1936), who we have already noted as a providing a
precursor definition of what became known as “affordance,”
developed a simple equation (Equation 1) to model behavior (B)
as a function f of Person (P) and environment (E).
B = f (P, E) (1)
This simply states that behavior of a person is directly connected
to the environment in which they act. In order to address some of
the issues surrounding the debate over what “affordance” might
be, Turvey (1992) proposed a formal definition (Equation 2
which one can see is inheriting Lewin’s idea). This can be
expressed as:
Wp, q = j(Xp, Zq) possesses r (2)
In other words an Environment or World, W, has properties
p and q which can be defined as the joining, j, of an object X
(with property p) and an animal Z (with effectivity q) in order to
produce an affordance relationship, r. In this account, the animal
has a set of dispositions, characterized in terms of effectivity,
which enable it to respond to object properties. So, an adult
human hand can grasp the handle of a full cup and lift it in
a way that a child’s smaller hand might not be able to: from
Equation (2), the cup_handle (for the adult) affords grasping
(because its property, p, defined by its size and shape, matches
the disposition, q, of the person, defined by hand-size), and the
full_cup affords lifting because of the adult’s strength. As noted
previously, Stoffregen (2003) questioned Turvey’s (1992) claim
that effectivities are dispositions. He suggested that it makesmore
sense to regard these as abilities that can be called upon in a given
situation. This is useful because it means that the response that a
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designermight expect to elicit using a given form could be correct
in terms of effectivity but not ability, and so, affordance is about
matching ability not disposition.
For Stoffregen (2003), affordance emerges from the World-
Object-Animal system and is not a property of any one of these
in isolation. Thus, Stoffregen (2003) offered Equation (3).
Wp, q = (Xp, Zq) possesses h (3)
What the formal descriptions struggle to present is the discretion
with which such responses are made. In other words, is it
possible to not respond to an object’s “solicitation” of a response?
Certainly, this is not easy to see from Turvey’s (1992) account.
For Stoffregen (2003), the post-hoc description of an affordance
as something that has occurred in a system, rather blurs this
problem.
To consider the problem more concretely, the notion of
Stimulus-Response Compatibility has been a staple part of
Ergonomics design thinking for the past half century. To
illustrate this idea, imagine that you have a row of 4 lights in
front of you (labeled 1–4), and between you and the lights is a row
of 4 buttons (labeled A–D). The buttons and lights are arranged
so that 1 and A are adjacent, etc. When one of the lights turns
on, you must press one of the buttons to turn off this light as
quickly as possible. In the adjacent (or congruent) arrangement,
when light1 turns on, you press button A. In an incongruent
arrangement, when light 1 turns on, you have to press, say, button
C. Not surprisingly, the congruent arrangement leads to much
faster performance. Early accounts of the SRC suggested that
the performance differences were due to “translation” (Fitts and
Seeger, 1953; Fitts and Deininger, 1954; Welford, 1976). People
prefer arrangements in which the elements (light and button) are
congruent, and this is termed a Population Stereotype (there is
some work to suggest that different cultures might have slightly
different Population Stereotypes). Furthermore, most people
produce faster responses with fewer errors in Sets of stimulus-
response pairings which have this preferred arrangement, and
this defines Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC). A popular
explanation of SRC relates to the ability to extract salient
features and pair these with an appropriate response. This is
the “dimensional overlap” model (Kornbulm et al., 1990) and
broadly contrasts the overlap of dimensions (elements) in a set
(i.e., the congruence of arrangements) with the relevance of
elements within a set (i.e., how the features of a stimulus relate
to a response). For example, button presses could conceivably
be made in response to proper names. In this case, there is no
overlap between the layout of the buttons and the nature of
the stimulus, and there is no relevance of stimulus content to
response. On the other hand, button presses might be to the lights
(which might be labeled with proper names). In this case, there
is no relevance of the names, but there might be overlap between
the position of the light and the position of the button. Finally, the
congruent condition (arranging buttons and lights as described
earlier) has both overlap and relevance.
The relevance of SRC to HCI has been recently reviewed
in a paper by Proctor and Vu (2016), and they suggest that
it continues to provide useful guidelines for design. There is
much to be said for the empirical evidence from SRC. From
the perspective of affordance, it could be argued that SRC arises
when information from environment (stimulus) relates to ability
(response). In other words, there is potential argument that
removes the need to appeal to a “translation” or a “dimensional
overlap” to explain this. In their paper, Proctor and Vu (2016)
argue against “affordance” and suggest that it merely describes
a particular form of spatial compatibility. I felt that they
misrepresented the basic ideas of affordance and agree with
Stins and Michaels (1997), who argued that, in SRC studies,
the “information” could include more than just the position of
the response buttons (as SRC tends to assume). Crossing one’s
hands in SRC experiments leads to an increase in reaction time,
even when the position of stimulus and response objects remain
constant, and this does not seem to be the result of a simple
biomechanical constraint; reactions using crossed hands cannot
be explained solely by conflict management, as proposed by the
dimensional overlap model. This suggests that the relationship
between response and stimulus involves more than the simple
mappings that SRC assumes. Further, SRC studies often fail to
control properly for the different compatibility effects that could
arise from the use of different response actions that are required.
Finally, SRC studies do not seem to be able to account for how
changes in ability can lead to changes in performance. Having
said that, the formal approaches to affordance outlined, above
do not account for this either. If we refer back to the formalisms
outlined in Equations (2) and (3), it is difficult to see how these
could account for the differences in SRC. In both congruent
and incongruent conditions, Xp would be “light on,” and Zq
would be “press button.” So, perhaps, we need to elaborate the
Xp description to include Xp1 “light on” + Xp2 “light adjacent
to button” (in the congruent condition), and to elaborate Zq1
“associate light label with button label” + Zq2 “press button” in
the incongruent condition.
While the formal descriptions of Turvey (1992) and
Stoffregen (2003) are directed at the immediate relationship
between an object and its user, this does not fully capture the
situation in which the relationship arises. For Kirlik (2004), a
problem with Stoffregen’s (2003) equation is that there does
not appear to any constraint on how to define the parameters.
Abbate and Bass (2017) develop a variation of Stoffregen’s (2003)
formalism that works with a priori constraints (Equation 4):
Possesses(affordancei)(Xp, Zq) (4)
This relationship becomes expandable with specific values of
the elements of X that are relevant to a given “goal” and
with specific values that define the ability of Z required to
respond to these features. As an example, Abbate and Bass
(2017) propose that an aircraft cabin door is plugged into its
fitting under high external pressure, and that (on the ground)
the door can be opened by pulling out a lever and then
turning it. So, in this case, there are two affordances of interest,
i.e., leverLiftable, and doorOpenable. These can be defined
as follows:
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possesses(leverLiftable)(Xp, Zq)= true if:
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp1[Slot][bottom_of]=overlapping ∧
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.p1 x (Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.p1 - Xp.Airspacep1)+ Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp2 ≤
Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverq1[position_up]
possesses(doorOpenable)(Xp, Zq)= true if:
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp1[Slot][top_of]=overlapping ∧
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.p2 [Cabin][left_of]= contained_within ∧
Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.q1[position_back]= true ∧ Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.q1[translate_left]=true
This formal description elaborates the context under which the
lever “affords” lifting and the door “affords” opening (in terms
of external air pressure and the position of the lever, and in
terms of the action performed by the person). In order for the
person to perform the action, they need to apply the appropriate
force to the lever—so this is intended to reflect ability rather
than disposition. However, there is somethingmissing from these
formal accounts, and that is the rationale for performing the
action in the first place. One way of considering this is to turn to
suggestions that “affordance” is hierarchical and can be described
in terms of different levels.
Levels of Affordance
Although Abbate and Bass (2017) relate values for X and Z to
an affordance relationship, they do not say how the affordance
itself relates to a particular “goal,” such as lift_lever or open_door.
McGrenere and Ho (2000) use the term “possibility for action”
to indicate that there might be levels of affordance. One way of
thinking of this is in terms of “sequential affordance” (Gaver,
1996). For example, grasping a lever handle “affords” lifting,
which then releases the door and, so “affords,” opening the
door. In this sequence, affordances are “nested,” i.e., the lever’s
“graspability” is nested in the door’s “openability.” I am not
convinced that it makes sense to call this a “sequence of
affordances,” so much as a sequence of actions, but can see how
one could apply the formal descriptions outlined above to each
“state” in the ongoing sequence of interactions between person
and object. What is interesting about this perspective is that
the “door_handle” contributes to several “affording situations.”
Consider, for example, turning the door handle when you were
carrying a pile of books or a cup of coffee, as opposed to turning
it with an unencumbered hand.
The notion that affordances could have multiple instances was
also discussed by Hartson (2003) who suggested that affordances
could be: cognitive, physical, sensory, with each of these helping
users to perform cognitive, physical or sensory action. This seems
to me to conflate different notions of “affordance” in ways that
are not helpful. For instance, while affordance describes the
relationship between the form of an object and the person’s
action, it is not obvious how this relates to cognitive and
sensory actions. Similarly, Turner (2005) contrasted what he
termed “simple affordance” (which draws on Gibson’s definition)
with “complex affordance” (which involves interpretation and
response to an object’s form in terms of the user’s culture,
history, praxis). However, applying the term “affordance” to such
different behaviors can only serve to increase confusion. To this
end, I proposed a different terminology to describe these different
levels.
Forms of Engagement
In order to explore the concept of affordance further, and tomake
use of the suggestion that there are different levels of “affordance”
that provide constraints of the ways in which we interact with
objects, I developed the idea of forms of engagement (Baber,
2003, 2006). In this, the focus is on the ways in which we engage
with objects and how different forms can serve to support and
constrain each other. The most recent version of this concept
is illustrated by Figure 1. The arrows are intended to indicate
the relation “constrains.” Note that, at the center of Figure 1
is a dotted box which is labeled “affordance.” This describes a
relationship between the ability to recognize salient features in an
object (Environmental Engagement) and the ability to act using
that object (Motor Engagement).
Figure 1 separates the effectivity of the person, in terms
of Morphological Engagement, from ability, in terms of motor
engagement. There are two reasons for this: first, morphology
is partly dispositional, e.g., in terms of the size of the hand;
and second, hand shaping will be influenced by subsequent
actions, e.g., when reaching to grasp an object, hand shape is
modified in anticipation of the type of grip required to respond
to properties of the object, such as weight, fullness, slipperiness
etc. (Wing et al., 1986), and this will also be influenced byMotor
Engagement, i.e., Rosenbaum et al. (1992) notion of “end-state
comfort” explains why peoplemight adopt an uncomfortable grip
at the beginning of an action, in order to end an action with a
comfortable grip. For example, if a wine glass is upside down on
the table, you will probably twist the hand awkwardly to pick it
up in order to turn it right-way up. So, there are a limited set of
ways in which an object can be grasped by the human hand and
the selection of grasp combines object properties with intended
movements. That is, a hand of a given size will have limits of how
it can grasp objects, but how the grasp is performed reflects the
ability and intentions of the person, which will vary according to
a host of situational factors, as well as prior experience.
In order to act on an object, there is a need to respond to the
“information” that it conveys. I am using the word information
in a Gibsonian sense, and apply the term Environmental
Engagement to reflect this. Consequently, an affordance arises as
the result of the relationship between Environmental and Motor
Engagement. For example, people can make rapid judgements
about whether to turn their body to fit through narrow apertures
as they approach these (Warren andWhang, 1987) and can make
such judgements even when their bodies have been modified
to an unfamiliar size, e.g., when wearing “pregnancy packs” on
the front (Franchak and Adolph, 2014), or when wearing rugby
shoulder pads (Higuchi et al., 2011). Furthermore, increasing
the weight of the body, e.g., by wearing a heavy rucksack, can
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FIGURE 1 | Forms of Engagement (2017 version).
alter judgements of the steepness of a hill (Profitt, 2006). The
implication is that there is a “body-scaled” perception of some
features of the environment that can guide some actions (Warren,
1984; Fajen, 2007). In other words, people are able to “see” aspects
of the object, or the environment, in terms of an action that they
both want, and are able, to perform. We can directly relate this
proposal to Equation (2), e.g., imagine we are interested in stair-
climbing, and the property of the world,Xp, is the height of a stair
riser, and the property of the person, Zq, is their leg length.
This could, of course, be termed “perception-action coupling”
(which is a common expression of Gibson’s ideas and a
reasonable explanation of affordance from the perspective
adopted in this paper). So, I retain the term “affordance” for
the specific relationship between object and action—and regard
this as an emerging property of the world-object-person system.
However, this relationship is bounded by the other forms of
engagement. The suggestion that Motor Engagement is directed
toward subsequent action implies an intention, but I argue that
there is equal scope that the “intention” can be defined in
response to the Motor Engagement (opportunistic or situated
action). At the very least, there is a two-way exchange between the
action-as-performed and the goal-state of that action. The role of
Cognitive Engagement is to provide this high-level management
on ongoing actions. Across the various forms of engagement,
Perceptual Engagement relates salient features to changing state
of the object-person system. Finally, the notion of an “acceptable”
goal could relate to the culture in which one is acting. This
Cultural Engagement relates to the idea of “complex affordance”
(Turner, 2005). It could also relate to the concept of “cultural
affordances” developed by Ramstead et al. (2016).
The basic concept of Forms of Engagement is intended to
retain “affordance” as a simple relationship between the actions
a person performs to the features of the object that they are
using. The connections between the different forms represent the
constraints that shape and respond to this relationship. I claim
that this provides a useful way of conceptualizing interaction,
and use this to explore ways in which one can design animate
objects.
Animate Objects
Having proposed that interaction comprises a number of Forms
of Engagement, one can relate these to the possible inferences that
animate objects could make as they are being interacted with. At
the most basic level, sensors on the object could provide data to
characterize the motion, orientation, position, etc. of the object.
However, what would be most useful is not just identifying that
a movement has been made but also to identify how well that
movement has been made, e.g., has it been performed smoothly,
hesitantly, with tremor etc. In this way, the object would be able to
make inferences about the user’s Motor Engagement and abilities.
Additional sensing capability could be added to monitor hand
shape andmovement as it approaches the object, in order tomake
inferences concerning Morphological Engagement. This could
be used to determine the type of action that the person might
be intending to make, even before picking up or handling the
object. Previously I have contrasted these as epistemic or ergotic
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gestures, to reflect the fact that such actions could be treated as
“gestures” which have the intention of altering the state of the
user’s environment (Baber, 2014).
The object, assuming that it can modify its appearance,
could encourage Environmental Engagement through changes
that emphasize specific features. So, when a handle rises on
the side of a cup, people are more likely to use the hand
on that side of the cup to pick it up (Baber et al., 2017).
Having some knowledge of where the object is being used could
also influence the definition of appropriate actions, through
Cultural Engagement. Combining inferences drawn from Motor
and Morphological Engagement, the object could infer the
most likely intention of the person, and use this inference
to provide additional cues and guidance (Jean-Baptiste et al.,
2015).
Let us assume that the “smart object” looks like something
familiar, say a cup, which has been fitted with sensors (Gellersen
et al., 1999; Baber et al., 2017). On the one hand, this is an
object that we “know” how to use, but on the other hand, this
is an alien object that is capable of doing things that we do
not, necessarily, fully understand. The cup could, for example,
be part of a system that monitors our daily liquid intake and
the system could have a “goal” of ensuring that we drink a
specified quantity of liquid, or it might be part of a system that
has the “goal” of reducing our caffeine intake. One way in which
such “goals” could be communicated to the user would for the
artifacts themselves (through lights, sounds, movement etc.) to
provide feedback and prompts to the person. In this way, the
form of the objects could display their function. I am interested
in this relationship between form and function (both in terms
of “normal” and “smart” objects), and how the “function” of an
object corresponds to the action in which it is used. There are
many instances in which the “action” is quite different from the
designed “function,” e.g., a laptop could be used to prop the leg
of a wobbly desk, or as a tray to carry several coffee cups, or as a
weapon.
Implications for Design
I close this paper with some observations on how the concept
of Forms of Engagement could apply to broader areas of HCI
design. There seems to me to be a division between those
practitioners who are interested in usability and those interested
in user experience (Baber, 2015). The “usability” focus tends
to emphasize performance (although, of course, International
Standards Organization definitions of usability include efficiency,
effectiveness and experience), while “user experience” tends to
focus on the emotional response (from pleasure to frustration)
that users get from their interactions with technology. Broadly,
I would suggest that usability takes as its “context of use,” the
region in Figure 1 that is defined by Environmental, Motor,
Morphological, Perceptual and Cognitive Engagement, while
“user experience” takes as its focus the region in Figure 1 that
is defined by Cultural, Cognitive and Perceptual Engagement. Of
course, I am not claiming that there is not overlap between these
regions, but it seems to me that the differences in practice relate
to the different levels of analysis that practitioners emphasize.
It would, one hopes, be profitable and useful to merge these
practices of evaluation of HCI.
A final point for this paper is that I do not believe that it
is possible to “design affordance” into an object. This is the
fundamental argument made in this paper. However, I do believe
that it is possible to create affording situations—and that this is
what good design has always sought to achieve. Knowing how a
person with given ability would interact with an object to achieve
a given goal in a given context is central to ISO definitions of
Human-Centred Design. What I have offered in this paper is a
conceptual framework that illustrates this goal, and relates it to
an unambiguous interpretation of the concept of “affordance.”
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